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 End-of-the-World Trade 
Donald MacKenzie 
Last November, I spent several days in the skyscrapers of Canary Wharf, in banks’ 
headquarters in the City and in the pale wood and glass of a hedge fund’s St James’s office 
trying to understand the credit crisis that had erupted over the previous four months. I became 
intrigued by an oddity that I came to think of as the end-of-the-world trade. The trade is the 
purchase of insurance against what would in effect be the failure of the modern capitalist 
system. It would take a cataclysm – around a third of the leading investment-grade 
corporations in Europe or half those in North America going bankrupt and defaulting on their 
debt – for the insurance to be paid out. 
I asked one investment banker what might cause half of North America’s top corporations to 
default. No ordinary economic recession or natural disaster short of an asteroid strike could 
do it: no hurricane, for example, and not even ‘the big one’, a catastrophic earthquake 
devastating California. All he could think of was ‘a revolutionary Marxist government in 
Washington’. That’s not a likely scenario, yet the cost of insuring against it had shot up ten-
fold. Normally one can buy $10 million of end-of-the-world insurance for between two and 
three thousand dollars a year. By early last November, the prices quoted were between twenty 
and thirty thousand, and even then it was difficult to buy in quantity – at least, said the 
banker, ‘not from anyone you trusted’. 
Of course, the credit crisis has increased the risk of systemic economic failure. But the 
existence and rising price of the end-of-the-world trade indicate something beyond that. The 
crisis isn’t just about the bursting of the US housing bubble and dodgy sub-prime lending. 
Nor is it merely a reflection of the perennial cycle in which greed trumps fear to create a 
euphoric disregard of risk, only for fear to reassert itself as the risk becomes too great. What 
is revealed by the end-of-the-world trade is that the current crisis concerns the collapse of 
public fact. 
A price or an interest rate quoted by one person or firm to another and agreed between them 
is a private fact. That isn’t good enough for many purposes. Even purely bilateral transactions 
are facilitated if there is a public fact, in this example a known and credible ‘market price’ or 
‘market interest rate’, that can be consulted to check whether a quoted price or rate is fair. 
Trustworthy public estimates of borrowers’ creditworthiness make debt markets far more 
liquid than they would be if borrowers’ capacity to meet their obligations had to be 
investigated from scratch. Believable bank balance sheets encourage banks to lend to each 
other; it was the suspension of such lending that undid Northern Rock. As the American 
sociologists Bruce Carruthers and Arthur Stinchcombe pointed out in the journal Theory and 
Society in 1999, market liquidity – plentiful borrowing and lending, or buying and selling – 
‘is, among other things, an issue in the sociology of knowledge’. Believable market prices, 
valuations, credit ratings and balance sheets encourage lending, active trading, competition 
and keen pricing. If credibility is lost, then everyone becomes wary of lending, deals aren’t 
done, and an increased proportion of sellers are the desperate, who have to accept fire-sale 
prices. 
At the core of the current crisis is a set of mechanisms for the transfer of credit risk (the risk 
that borrowers default), in particular collateralised debt obligations (CDOs). The first CDOs 
were created in 1996-97 by banks that wished to pay others to take on the risks of the loans 
they had made. From 1999 onwards, CDOs were also pursued simply as money-making 
opportunities, and hedge funds as well as banks started to set them up. 
CDOs come in many varieties, but one way for a bank or hedge fund to set one up is to create 
a separate legal entity known as a special purpose vehicle (typically registered in the Cayman 
Islands). The vehicle then buys assets such as corporate bonds, loans and bonds backed by 
mortgages, either from the parent bank – if, for example, the motive for the CDO is to reduce 
the risk of its loan portfolio – or on the open market. 
To raise the money that’s needed for these purchases and to create the opportunity for profit, 
the vehicle sells a hierarchically structured set of investments backed (‘collateralised’) by the 
pool of assets the CDO has bought. At the bottom of the hierarchy is the ‘equity’ tranche. 
Losses caused by default of the assets in the pool are absorbed in the first place by investors 
in this tranche, who in compensation receive the highest rates of return, often as high as 15-
20 per cent. Next in the hierarchy is the mezzanine tranche or tranches, the investors in which 
incur a loss only if defaults are sufficiently bad to wipe out the equity tranche completely. 
Above the mezzanine is the senior tranche, and above that the super-senior. Because the 
buffer of the equity and mezzanine tranches stand between it and any losses, the senior 
tranche is usually regarded as very safe (equivalent to a corporate bond with the highest 
rating, AAA), and super-senior as even safer than that. Correspondingly, investors in these 
tranches have to accept rates of return substantially lower than those in the equity and 
mezzanine tranches. 
For a structure as complicated as a CDO to be attractive to investors, facts about it need to be 
created: ratings, crucially, awarded to its tranches by firms such as Standard & Poor’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch. Traditionally, the core business of these rating agencies is to grade bonds 
issued by corporations. They divide these between ‘investment-grade’ and ‘speculative’ 
(colloquially, ‘junk’), and there are multiple categories indicating how high in investment 
grade, or how low in speculative grade, a bond is. Standard & Poor’s, for example, has ten 
categories of investment grade, ranging from AAA down to BBB–. Recently, however, a 
large part of what rating agencies have done is to grade CDO tranches. Many investment 
institutions are strongly guided by ratings, and some are allowed to invest only in investment-
grade products. The success of CDOs has rested on the way they can be set so that the 
mezzanine and senior tranches can achieve investment-grade ratings while offering higher 
rates of return than equivalently rated corporate or government bonds. 
To award a rating, or more generally to work out the value of a CDO, requires one to take 
three main things into account. First is the risk of default on each of the debt instruments in 
the asset pool. Past data are useful here – the rating agencies have kept records of corporate 
defaults for decades – and the market’s current view of such risk can be worked out, either 
from the yield of the bond involved (a risky bond has to offer a higher yield before investors 
will buy it) or from the cost of credit default swaps. Like CDOs, these swaps are ‘credit 
derivatives’ – products built on the underlying market for bonds and loans – and they too 
have grown rapidly over the past decade. They are insurance, essentially, against the risk of 
an individual company defaulting. Under normal circumstances, credit default swaps are 
actively traded (far more often than a company’s underlying bonds or loans), and thus have a 
credible market price. 
A second issue is ‘recovery rates’: the amounts that creditors will get back when borrowers 
default. Though these rates vary, it’s common in CDO valuation simply to assume a recovery 
rate of 40 per cent. Third, one needs to take into account the extent to which defaults by 
different borrowers are likely to cluster. Some defaults are the result of idiosyncratic 
problems causing the bankruptcy of a single corporation, but others reflect systemic factors 
such as poor conditions in the economy as a whole. If the latter, then one corporation’s 
default is likely to be accompanied by others. 
The extent to which default risks are linked is known in the world of credit derivatives as 
‘correlation’. If correlation is low, defaults aren’t likely to cluster much, and only the equity 
tranche of a typical CDO would normally be thought of as carrying significant risk of loss. If, 
on the other hand, correlation is high and defaults tend to come in clumps, then the 
mezzanine and conceivably even the senior tranches can be hit. 
Correlation is by far the trickiest issue in valuing a CDO. Indeed, it is difficult to be precise 
about what correlation actually means: in practice, its determination is a task of mathematical 
modelling. Over the past ten years, a model known as the ‘single-factor Gaussian copula’ has 
become standard. ‘Single-factor’ means that the degree of correlation is assumed to reflect 
the varying extent to which fortunes of each debt-issuer depend on a single underlying 
variable, which one can interpret as the health of the economy. ‘Copula’ indicates that the 
mathematical issue being addressed is the connectedness of default risks, and ‘Gaussian’ 
refers to the use of a multi-dimensional variant of the statistician’s standard bell-shaped curve 
to model this connectedness. 
The single-factor Gaussian copula is far from perfect: even before the crisis hit, I wasn’t able 
to get a single insider to express complete confidence in it. Nevertheless, it became a market 
Esperanto, allowing people in different institutions to discuss CDO valuation in a mutually 
intelligible way. But having a standard model is only part of the task of understanding 
correlation. Historical data are much less useful here. Defaults are rare events, and producing 
a plausible statistical estimate of the extent of the correlation between, say, the risk of default 
by Ford and by General Motors is difficult or impossible. So as CDOs gained popularity in 
the late 1990s and early years of this decade, often the best one could do was simply to 
employ a uniform, standard figure such as 30 per cent correlation, or use the correlation 
between two corporations’ stock prices as a proxy for their default correlations. 
However imperfect the modelling of CDOs was, the results were regarded by the rating 
agencies as facts solid enough to allow them to grade CDO tranches. Indeed, the agencies 
made the models they used public knowledge in the credit markets: Standard & Poor’s, for 
example, was prepared to supply participants with copies of its ‘CDO Evaluator’ software 
package. A bank or hedge fund setting up a standard CDO could therefore be confident of the 
ratings it would achieve. Creators of CDOs liked that it was then possible to offer attractive 
returns to investors – which are normally banks, hedge funds, insurance companies, pension 
funds and the like, not private individuals – while retaining enough of the cash-flow from the 
asset pool to make the effort worthwhile. As markets recovered from the bursting of the 
dotcom and telecom bubble in 2000-2, the returns from traditional assets – including the 
premium for holding risky assets – fell sharply. (The effectiveness of CDOs and other credit 
derivatives in allowing banks to shed credit risk meant that they generally survived the end of 
the bubble without significant financial distress.) By early 2007, market conditions had been 
benign for nearly five years, and central bankers were beginning to talk of the ‘Great 
Stability’. In it, CDOs flourished. 
Ratings aside, however, the world of CDOs remained primarily one of private facts. Each 
CDO is normally different from every other, and the prices at which tranches are sold to 
investors are not usually publicly known. So credible market prices did not exist. The 
problem was compounded by one of the repercussions of the Enron scandal. A trader who has 
done a derivatives deal wants to be able to ‘book’ the profits immediately, in other words 
have them recognised straightaway in his employer’s accounts and thus in the bonus that he 
is awarded that year. Enron and its traders had been doing this on the basis of questionable 
assumptions, and accounting regulators and auditors – the latter mindful of the way in which 
the giant auditing firm Arthur Andersen collapsed having been prosecuted for its role in the 
Enron episode – began to clamp down, insisting on the use of facts (observable market 
values) rather than mere assumptions in ‘booking’ derivatives. That credit correlation was not 
observable thus became much more of a problem. 
From 2003 to 2004, however, the leading dealers in the credit-derivatives market set up fact-
generating mechanisms that alleviated these difficulties: credit indices. These resemble 
CDOs, but do not involve the purchase of assets and, crucially, are standard in their 
construction. For example, the European and the North American investment-grade indices 
(the iTraxx and CDX IG) cover set lists of 125 investment-grade corporations. In the 
terminology of the market, you can ‘buy protection’ or ‘sell protection’ on either an index as 
a whole or on standard tranches of it. A protection seller receives fees from the buyer, but has 
to pay out if one or more defaults hit the index or tranche in question. 
The fluctuating price of protection on an index as a whole, which is publicly known, provides 
a snapshot of market perceptions of credit conditions, while the trading of index tranches 
made correlation into something apparently observable and even tradeable. The Gaussian 
copula or a similar model can be applied ‘backwards’ to work out the level of correlation 
implied by the cost of protection on a tranche, which again is publicly known. That helped to 
satisfy auditors and to facilitate the booking of profits. A new breed of ‘correlation traders’ 
emerged, who trade index tranches as a way of taking a position on shifts in credit 
correlation. 
Indices and other tranches quickly became a huge-volume, liquid market. They facilitated the 
creation not just of standard CDOs but of bespoke products such as CDO-like structures that 
consist only of mezzanine tranches (which offer combinations of returns and ratings that 
many investors found especially attractive). Products of this kind leave their creators heavily 
exposed to changes in credit-market conditions, but the index market permitted them to hedge 
(that is, offset) this exposure. 
All this activity explains the attractiveness of the end-of-the-world trade. The trade is the 
buying and selling of protection on the safest, super-senior tranches of the investment-grade 
indices. No one buys protection on these tranches because they are looking for a big pay-out 
if capitalism crumbles: if nothing else, they have no reason to expect that the institution that 
sold them protection would survive the carnage and be able to make the pay-out. Instead, 
they are looking to hedge their exposure to movements in the credit market, especially in 
correlation. Traders need to demonstrate they’ve done this before they’re allowed to book the 
profits on their deals, so from their viewpoint it’s worth buying protection, for example from 
‘monolines’ (bond insurers), even if the latter would almost certainly be insolvent well before 
any pay-out on the protection was due. 
With problems such as the non-observability of correlation apparently adequately solved by 
the development of indices, the credit-derivatives market, which emerged little more than a 
decade ago, had grown by June 2007 to an aggregate total of outstanding contracts of $51 
trillion, the equivalent of $7,700 for every person on the planet. It is perhaps the most 
sophisticated sector of the global financial markets, and a fertile source of employment for 
mathematicians, whose skills are needed to develop models better than the single-factor 
Gaussian copula. 
The credit market is also one of the most computationally intensive activities in the modern 
world. An investment bank with a big presence in the market will have thousands of positions 
in credit default swaps, CDOs, indices and similar products. The calculations needed to 
understand and hedge the exposure of this portfolio to market movements are run, often 
overnight, on grids of several hundred interconnected computers. The banks’ modellers 
would love to add as many extra computers as possible to the grids, but often they can’t do so 
because of the limits imposed by the capacity of air-conditioning systems to remove heat 
from computer rooms. In the City, the strain put on electricity-supply networks can also be a 
problem. Those who sell computer hardware to investment banks are now sharply aware that 
‘performance per watt’ is part of what they have to deliver. 
The boom in credit derivatives had wider effects, in particular increasing the appetite for low-
grade debt. A typical CDO, if it is to offer an attractive enough return to investors, has either 
to purchase risky (and thus high-yielding) bonds or loans in significant quantity, or to sell 
protection on such bonds and loans via credit default swaps. This fuelled the growth in 
private equity groups, which buy companies by borrowing very heavily, often by issuing 
large quantities of bonds. Because of the riskiness of heavily-indebted enterprises these bonds 
can achieve only junk ratings, but were attractive nonetheless to the creators of CDOs. 
Fatally, the demand for risky debt – which arose not just from CDOs, but from the sharply 
reduced returns available from safer assets more generally – also encompassed bonds based 
on sub-prime mortgages: home loans that are risky, usually because the borrower has a 
blemished credit record, but also because the loan-to-value or loan-to-income ratio is high, 
documentation is poor, or it’s a buy-to-let purchase or second mortgage. It is now well known 
that problems in the US sub-prime sector caused the credit market to turn in summer 2007 
from boom to crisis. 
It is important, however, to keep a sense of scale. Last autumn, the Bank of England 
calculated that bonds backed by US sub-prime mortgages totalled $0.7 trillion. That’s a lot of 
money, but it makes up only 2.5 per cent of the total value of non-governmental bonds and 
corporate loans outstanding worldwide. Sub-prime’s $0.7 trillion is, for example, dwarfed by 
the $11 trillion corporate bond market, of which $10.2 trillion is investment grade. Indeed, 
what is perhaps most striking about the credit crisis is that corporations outside the financial 
sector have remained generally in robust economic health, with bankruptcies and thus default 
rates at historic lows. Not a single investment-grade corporation has defaulted recently, and 
there haven’t even been any recent large-scale speculative-grade corporate defaults. 
Problems spilled over from sub-prime to sectors that hadn’t been experiencing financial 
distress in good part because of damage to the credit market’s fact-generating mechanisms. 
The rating agencies had graded products underpinned by sub-prime mortgages on the basis of 
previous experience of default rates and of the proceeds of the sale of repossessed properties, 
but had failed to take into account the effects of the bubble in housing prices in the US, the 
way in which the growth of mechanisms for transferring credit risk and the increased appetite 
for risky debt had altered the US mortgage market. Predatory and irresponsible lending by 
commission-hungry brokers had been encouraged by the way in which even the riskiest 
mortgages could so easily be packaged and sold on, leaving the original mortgage-lender free 
of losses in the event of default. Mortgage-backed products that the rating agencies had 
ranked as investment-grade started to incur major losses, and the agencies had to revise many 
ratings sharply downwards. To take an extreme but not wholly untypical case, Moody’s 
downgraded the top tranche of one mortgage-backed CDO by 14 notches. When it was issued 
in April last year the tranche was rated Aaa, the top of investment grade; by November, it 
was rated B2, well down in junk. 
The rating agencies are businesses, and the issuers of debt instruments pay the agencies to 
rate them. The potential conflict of interest has always been there, even in the days when the 
agencies mainly graded bonds, which generally they did quite sensibly. However, the way in 
which the crisis has thrust the conflict into the public eye has further threatened the 
credibility of ratings. ‘In today’s market, you really can’t trust any ratings,’ one money-
market fund manager told Bloomberg Markets in October 2007. She was far from alone in 
that verdict, and the result was cognitive contagion. Most investors’ ‘knowledge’ of the 
properties of CDOs and other structured products had been based chiefly on ratings, and the 
loss of confidence in them affected all such products, not just those based on sub-prime 
mortgages. Since last summer, it has been just about impossible to set up a new CDO. 
Even more damagingly, the credit world’s existing special purpose vehicles have found it 
harder and harder to obtain funds from the source that usually sustains them, the sale of 
‘commercial paper’ (short-term debt). Consequently, some vehicles have had to sell assets – 
not just mortgage-backed securities, but corporate loans and corporate bonds – to raise cash. 
The result of such forced selling, and the unwinding of positions in other sectors of the credit 
derivatives market, has been a sharply increased demand for protection, and much-
diminished willingness to sell it. As a result, the cost of protection has soared across all 
sectors of the credit market. The safest instruments have been affected as well as the riskiest 
ones, paradoxically sometimes to an even greater degree. For example, the returns from 
holding safe assets or selling protection on the safest index tranches were in the recent past 
paltry, so it was common for hedge funds and other market participants to finance such 
positions by borrowing, or by multiplying returns (and also potential losses) in other ways; 
this is called ‘leverage’. A popular product, for example, has been ‘leveraged super-senior’, 
investors in which sell end-of-the-world insurance, but with returns and risks multiplied by 
about ten. 
If you’re levered up, even relatively modest market movements can force you to liquidate 
your positions in a hurry to stop your losses becoming catastrophic. Leveraged super-senior 
and similar products, for example, typically have specified ‘unwind points’: thresholds, such 
as loss levels, at which the deal has to be unwound by buying protection equivalent to the 
protection one has sold. With what Jon Gregory of Barclays Capital estimates in Risk 
magazine to be around $100 billion of leveraged super-senior protection having been sold, 
even the fear of approaching unwind points can be deeply disturbing to the markets. 
Processes of this kind – changes internal to the world of credit derivatives, not in the level of 
the risks being insured against – have meant that investment-grade indices sometimes move 
by up to 20 per cent in a single day. At times, the price of end-of-the-world insurance has 
corresponded to utterly implausible correlation levels in excess of 90 per cent: meaning, in 
effect, that if one investment-grade corporation were to default, almost all of them would. 
Why aren’t such mispricings being corrected by savvy investors, eager to seize the 
opportunities for profit they create? Why, for example, have people not been selling end-of-
the-world insurance when the returns from doing so have jumped ten-fold while the risk of 
having to pay out remains small? A crucial part of the answer is that, paradoxically, a fact-
generating mechanism is blocking the restoration of fact. The mechanism is ‘marking-to-
market’, the compulsory revaluation of portfolios as market prices fluctuate. Its motivation is 
entirely sensible: for example, when regulators insist that banks mark-to-market, it should 
force them to disclose losses to their investors and creditors. 
Unfortunately, however, marking-to-market makes market participants extremely sensitive to 
short-term price fluctuations. To sell end-of-the-world insurance, for example, is almost 
certainly an excellent long-term bet, but traders don’t do it because of the fear that in the 
short run its price may increase even further, causing a mark-to-market loss. Although it 
would be a paper loss, it would have real consequences, damaging your bank’s balance sheet 
and profits, threatening your bonus, and typically forcing you to transfer valuable collateral to 
the custody of the buyer of the insurance. 
Over recent months, banks have frequently been accused of hiding their credit losses. The 
truth is scarier: such losses are extremely hard to measure credibly. Marking-to-market 
requires that there be plausible market prices to use in valuing a portfolio. But the issuing of 
CDOs has effectively stopped, liquidity has dried up in large sectors of the credit default 
swap market, and the credibility of the cost of protection in the index market has been 
damaged by processes of the kind I’ve been discussing. 
How, for example, can one value a portfolio of mortgage-backed securities when trading in 
those securities has ceased? It has become common to use a set of credit indices, the ABX-
HE (Asset Backed, Home Equity), as a proxy for the underlying mortgage market, which is 
now too illiquid for prices in it to be credible. However, the ABX-HE is itself affected by the 
processes that have undermined the robustness of the apparent facts produced by other 
sectors of the index market; in particular, the large demand for protection and reduced supply 
of it may mean the indices have often painted too uniformly dire a picture of the prospects for 
mortgage-backed securities. One trader told the Financial Times in April that the liquidity of 
the indices had become very poor: ‘Trading is mostly happening on interdealer screens 
between eight or ten guys, and this means that prices can move wildly on very light volume.’ 
Yet because the level of the ABX-HE indices is used by banks’ accountants and auditors to 
value their multi-billion dollar portfolios of mortgage-backed securities, this esoteric market 
has considerable effects, since low valuations weaken banks’ balance sheets, curtailing their 
capacity to lend and thus damaging the wider economy. 
Josef Ackermann, the head of Deutsche Bank, has caused a stir by admitting ‘I no longer 
believe in the market’s self-healing power.’ The state has had to stand between the market 
and the abyss. Had the British government not rescued Northern Rock, bank runs would have 
brought down other institutions and destroyed confidence in the UK’s financial system. Had 
the Federal Reserve not bailed out Bear Stearns, at least one other major Wall Street bank 
would most likely have failed, and chaos might have ensued. With private lending having 
dried up, government-sponsored lenders now provide 90 per cent of the funding of new 
mortgages in the US. 
Modern central banking, backed ultimately by the tax payer, can almost certainly prevent 
financial catastrophe on the scale of 1929. Restoring normality, which requires repairing the 
cognitive state of modern finance, is quite a different matter. As Carruthers and Stinchcombe 
note, market liquidity depends on facts. However, today’s financial facts depend on liquidity. 
The credit markets remain stuck in a vicious circle. 
There are some signs that repair might be possible. Pension funds, which are under less 
immediate pressure to mark-to-market, have started to sell end-of-the-world insurance, and if 
they do so on a larger scale, liquidity and thus credible prices may return to that part of the 
index market. The rescue of Bear Stearns persuaded many traders that the Federal Reserve 
will not allow any major US bank to collapse, and a $19 billion write-down (a reduction in 
the balance-sheet valuation of its portfolio) by the Swiss Bank UBS in early April was widely 
seen as a nadir, the valuation now so low that it was unlikely to fall much further. 
But there have been false dawns before. In early October 2007, as US banks first started to 
report large write-downs of their credit portfolios, their share prices surprisingly soared. ‘It 
seems that the more money you lose,’ one banker told the Financial Times, ‘the more your 
shares go up.’ It had begun to seem as if the banks had the measure of the crisis, and facts 
were on the way to being restored. However, that impression quickly evaporated as within 
weeks the estimates of losses jumped upwards. For example, by 20 October Merrill Lynch 
had increased its estimate of its losses from $4.5 billion to $7.9 billion. That’s the problem 
with facts. Once they fall apart, they are very difficult to put back together again. 
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